- Add HTTP security headers to vhost configuration.
- Version to install is requested and no longer part of the configuration file.
This commit is contained in:
parent
a53d252d69
commit
7427ebec6b
@ -2,10 +2,6 @@
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# - Configuration for postfixadmin install script
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# - Configuration for postfixadmin install script
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# -----------------------------------------------
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# -----------------------------------------------
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# - Version of Postfix Admin
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# -
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PF_ADMIN_VERSION=
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# - Name of the website - usualy 'webmail.<domain>.<tld>'
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# - Name of the website - usualy 'webmail.<domain>.<tld>'
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# -
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# -
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WEBSITE_NAME=""
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WEBSITE_NAME=""
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@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ declare -A check_entry_main_cf_arr
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# - Functions
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# - Functions
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# -------------
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# -------------
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clean_up() {
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# Perform program exit housekeeping
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rm -f "$log_file"
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exit $1
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}
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echononl(){
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echononl(){
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echo X\\c > /tmp/shprompt$$
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echo X\\c > /tmp/shprompt$$
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if [ `wc -c /tmp/shprompt$$ | awk '{print $1}'` -eq 1 ]; then
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if [ `wc -c /tmp/shprompt$$ | awk '{print $1}'` -eq 1 ]; then
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@ -50,7 +57,7 @@ fatal(){
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echo ""
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echo ""
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echo -e "\t\033[31m\033[1mInstalllation wird abgebrochen\033[m\033[m"
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echo -e "\t\033[31m\033[1mInstalllation wird abgebrochen\033[m\033[m"
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echo ""
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echo ""
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exit 1
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clean_up 1
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}
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}
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error(){
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error(){
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@ -151,6 +158,25 @@ else
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echo_ok
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echo_ok
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fi
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fi
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echo -e "\033[32m--\033[m"
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echo ""
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echo "Version of the Postfixadmin to install"
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echo ""
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echo ""
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PF_ADMIN_VERSION=
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while [ "X$PF_ADMIN_VERSION" = "X" ]
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do
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echononl "Postfixadmin Version: "
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read PF_ADMIN_VERSION
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if [ "X$PF_ADMIN_VERSION" = "X" ]; then
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echo -e "\n\t\033[33m\033[1mA version number is required!\033[m\n"
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fi
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done
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echo ""
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echo -e "\033[32m--\033[m"
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echo ""
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# - Default values
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# - Default values
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@ -1130,6 +1156,80 @@ cat <<EOF > ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
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RewriteCond %{HTTPS} !=on
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RewriteCond %{HTTPS} !=on
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RewriteRule (.*) https://%{SERVER_NAME}%{REQUEST_URI} [R=301,L]
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RewriteRule (.*) https://%{SERVER_NAME}%{REQUEST_URI} [R=301,L]
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# ==========
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# - HTTP security Headers
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# ==========
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# - X-Frame-Options
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# -
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# - The X-Frame-Options header (RFC), or XFO header, protects your visitors
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# - against clickjacking attacks. An attacker can load up an iframe on their
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# - site and set your site as the source, it's quite easy:
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# -
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# - <iframe src="https://scotthelme.co.uk"></iframe>
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# -
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# - Using some crafty CSS they can hide your site in the background and create some
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# - genuine looking overlays. When your visitors click on what they think is a harmless
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# - link, they're actually clicking on links on your website in the background. That
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# - might not seem so bad until we realise that the browser will execute those requests
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# - in the context of the user, which could include them being logged in and authenticated
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# - to your site!
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# -
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# - Troy Hunt has a great blog on 'Clickjack attack – the hidden threat right in front :
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# - of you':
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# -
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# - http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/05/clickjack-attack-hidden-threat-right-in.html
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# -
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# - Valid values include DENY meaning your site can't be framed, SAMEORIGIN which allows
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# - you to frame your own site or ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/ which lets you specify
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# -sites that are permitted to frame your own site.
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# -
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Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
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# - X-Xss-Protection
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# -
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# - This header is used to configure the built in reflective XSS protection found
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# - in Internet Explorer, Chrome and Safari (Webkit). Valid settings for the header
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# - are 0, which disables the protection, 1 which enables the protection
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# - and 1; mode=block which tells the browser to block the response if it
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# - detects an attack rather than sanitising the script.
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# -
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Header always set X-Xss-Protection "1; mode=block"
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# - X-Content-Type-Options
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# -
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# - Nice and easy to configure, this header only has one valid value, nosniff.
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# - It prevents Google Chrome and Internet Explorer from trying to mime-sniff
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# - the content-type of a response away from the one being declared by the server.
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# - It reduces exposure to drive-by downloads and the risks of user uploaded content
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# - that, with clever naming, could be treated as a different content-type, like
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# - an executable.
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# -
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Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
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# - Content Security Policy
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# -
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# - The CSP header allows you to define a whitelist of approved sources of content
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# - for your site. By restricting the assets that a browser can load for your site,
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# - like js and css, CSP can act as an effective countermeasure to XSS attacks. I
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# - have covered CSP in a lot more detail in my blog Content Security Policy - An
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# - Introduction (https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduction/).
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# -
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# - Here is a basic policy to enforce TLS on all assets and prevent
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# - mixed content warnings.
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# -
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#
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Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src https: data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'"
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# - Referrer-Policy
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# -
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# - The HTTP referer (originally a misspelling of referrer[1]) is an HTTP header
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# - field that identifies the address of the webpage (i.e. the URI or IRI) that
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# - linked to the resource being requested. By checking the referrer, the new
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# - webpage can see where the request originated.
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# -
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Header set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin
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CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-access.log combined
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CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-access.log combined
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ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-error.log
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ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-error.log
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@ -1197,7 +1297,79 @@ EOF
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fi
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fi
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cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
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cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
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SSLEngine on
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# ==========
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# - HTTP security Headers
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# ==========
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# - X-Frame-Options
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# -
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# - The X-Frame-Options header (RFC), or XFO header, protects your visitors
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# - against clickjacking attacks. An attacker can load up an iframe on their
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# - site and set your site as the source, it's quite easy:
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# -
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# - <iframe src="https://scotthelme.co.uk"></iframe>
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# -
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# - Using some crafty CSS they can hide your site in the background and create some
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# - genuine looking overlays. When your visitors click on what they think is a harmless
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# - link, they're actually clicking on links on your website in the background. That
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# - might not seem so bad until we realise that the browser will execute those requests
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# - in the context of the user, which could include them being logged in and authenticated
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# - to your site!
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# -
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# - Troy Hunt has a great blog on 'Clickjack attack – the hidden threat right in front :
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# - of you':
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# -
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# - http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/05/clickjack-attack-hidden-threat-right-in.html
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# -
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# - Valid values include DENY meaning your site can't be framed, SAMEORIGIN which allows
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# - you to frame your own site or ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/ which lets you specify
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# -sites that are permitted to frame your own site.
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# -
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Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
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# - X-Xss-Protection
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# -
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# - This header is used to configure the built in reflective XSS protection found
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# - in Internet Explorer, Chrome and Safari (Webkit). Valid settings for the header
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# - are 0, which disables the protection, 1 which enables the protection
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# - and 1; mode=block which tells the browser to block the response if it
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# - detects an attack rather than sanitising the script.
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# -
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Header always set X-Xss-Protection "1; mode=block"
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# - X-Content-Type-Options
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# -
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# - Nice and easy to configure, this header only has one valid value, nosniff.
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# - It prevents Google Chrome and Internet Explorer from trying to mime-sniff
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# - the content-type of a response away from the one being declared by the server.
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# - It reduces exposure to drive-by downloads and the risks of user uploaded content
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# - that, with clever naming, could be treated as a different content-type, like
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# - an executable.
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# -
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Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
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# - Content Security Policy
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# -
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# - The CSP header allows you to define a whitelist of approved sources of content
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# - for your site. By restricting the assets that a browser can load for your site,
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# - like js and css, CSP can act as an effective countermeasure to XSS attacks. I
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# - have covered CSP in a lot more detail in my blog Content Security Policy - An
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# - Introduction (https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduction/).
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# -
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# - Here is a basic policy to enforce TLS on all assets and prevent
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# - mixed content warnings.
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# -
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#
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Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src https: data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'"
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# - Referrer-Policy
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# -
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# - The HTTP referer (originally a misspelling of referrer[1]) is an HTTP header
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# - field that identifies the address of the webpage (i.e. the URI or IRI) that
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# - linked to the resource being requested. By checking the referrer, the new
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# - webpage can see where the request originated.
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# -
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Header set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin
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# - HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
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# - HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
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# -
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# -
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@ -1209,6 +1381,8 @@ cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
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# -
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# -
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Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000"
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Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000"
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SSLEngine on
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SSLCertificateFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_CERT
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SSLCertificateFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_CERT
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SSLCertificateKeyFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_KEY
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SSLCertificateKeyFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_KEY
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$SSLCertificateChainFile
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$SSLCertificateChainFile
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@ -1233,6 +1407,80 @@ cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
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RewriteCond %{HTTPS} !=on
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RewriteCond %{HTTPS} !=on
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RewriteRule (.*) https://%{SERVER_NAME}%{REQUEST_URI} [R=301,L]
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RewriteRule (.*) https://%{SERVER_NAME}%{REQUEST_URI} [R=301,L]
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# ==========
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# - HTTP security Headers
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# ==========
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
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# - X-Frame-Options
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - The X-Frame-Options header (RFC), or XFO header, protects your visitors
|
||||||
|
# - against clickjacking attacks. An attacker can load up an iframe on their
|
||||||
|
# - site and set your site as the source, it's quite easy:
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - <iframe src="https://scotthelme.co.uk"></iframe>
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Using some crafty CSS they can hide your site in the background and create some
|
||||||
|
# - genuine looking overlays. When your visitors click on what they think is a harmless
|
||||||
|
# - link, they're actually clicking on links on your website in the background. That
|
||||||
|
# - might not seem so bad until we realise that the browser will execute those requests
|
||||||
|
# - in the context of the user, which could include them being logged in and authenticated
|
||||||
|
# - to your site!
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Troy Hunt has a great blog on 'Clickjack attack – the hidden threat right in front :
|
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# - of you':
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# -
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||||||
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# - http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/05/clickjack-attack-hidden-threat-right-in.html
|
||||||
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# -
|
||||||
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# - Valid values include DENY meaning your site can't be framed, SAMEORIGIN which allows
|
||||||
|
# - you to frame your own site or ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/ which lets you specify
|
||||||
|
# -sites that are permitted to frame your own site.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - X-Xss-Protection
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - This header is used to configure the built in reflective XSS protection found
|
||||||
|
# - in Internet Explorer, Chrome and Safari (Webkit). Valid settings for the header
|
||||||
|
# - are 0, which disables the protection, 1 which enables the protection
|
||||||
|
# - and 1; mode=block which tells the browser to block the response if it
|
||||||
|
# - detects an attack rather than sanitising the script.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
Header always set X-Xss-Protection "1; mode=block"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - X-Content-Type-Options
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Nice and easy to configure, this header only has one valid value, nosniff.
|
||||||
|
# - It prevents Google Chrome and Internet Explorer from trying to mime-sniff
|
||||||
|
# - the content-type of a response away from the one being declared by the server.
|
||||||
|
# - It reduces exposure to drive-by downloads and the risks of user uploaded content
|
||||||
|
# - that, with clever naming, could be treated as a different content-type, like
|
||||||
|
# - an executable.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
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Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
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# - Content Security Policy
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - The CSP header allows you to define a whitelist of approved sources of content
|
||||||
|
# - for your site. By restricting the assets that a browser can load for your site,
|
||||||
|
# - like js and css, CSP can act as an effective countermeasure to XSS attacks. I
|
||||||
|
# - have covered CSP in a lot more detail in my blog Content Security Policy - An
|
||||||
|
# - Introduction (https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduction/).
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Here is a basic policy to enforce TLS on all assets and prevent
|
||||||
|
# - mixed content warnings.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
#
|
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Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src https: data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'"
|
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|
|
||||||
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# - Referrer-Policy
|
||||||
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# -
|
||||||
|
# - The HTTP referer (originally a misspelling of referrer[1]) is an HTTP header
|
||||||
|
# - field that identifies the address of the webpage (i.e. the URI or IRI) that
|
||||||
|
# - linked to the resource being requested. By checking the referrer, the new
|
||||||
|
# - webpage can see where the request originated.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
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Header set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin
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|
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CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-access.log combined
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CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-access.log combined
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ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-error.log
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ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}-error.log
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@ -1301,7 +1549,79 @@ EOF
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fi
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fi
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cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
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cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SSLEngine on
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# ==========
|
||||||
|
# - HTTP security Headers
|
||||||
|
# ==========
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - X-Frame-Options
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - The X-Frame-Options header (RFC), or XFO header, protects your visitors
|
||||||
|
# - against clickjacking attacks. An attacker can load up an iframe on their
|
||||||
|
# - site and set your site as the source, it's quite easy:
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - <iframe src="https://scotthelme.co.uk"></iframe>
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Using some crafty CSS they can hide your site in the background and create some
|
||||||
|
# - genuine looking overlays. When your visitors click on what they think is a harmless
|
||||||
|
# - link, they're actually clicking on links on your website in the background. That
|
||||||
|
# - might not seem so bad until we realise that the browser will execute those requests
|
||||||
|
# - in the context of the user, which could include them being logged in and authenticated
|
||||||
|
# - to your site!
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Troy Hunt has a great blog on 'Clickjack attack – the hidden threat right in front :
|
||||||
|
# - of you':
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/05/clickjack-attack-hidden-threat-right-in.html
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Valid values include DENY meaning your site can't be framed, SAMEORIGIN which allows
|
||||||
|
# - you to frame your own site or ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/ which lets you specify
|
||||||
|
# -sites that are permitted to frame your own site.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - X-Xss-Protection
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - This header is used to configure the built in reflective XSS protection found
|
||||||
|
# - in Internet Explorer, Chrome and Safari (Webkit). Valid settings for the header
|
||||||
|
# - are 0, which disables the protection, 1 which enables the protection
|
||||||
|
# - and 1; mode=block which tells the browser to block the response if it
|
||||||
|
# - detects an attack rather than sanitising the script.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
Header always set X-Xss-Protection "1; mode=block"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - X-Content-Type-Options
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Nice and easy to configure, this header only has one valid value, nosniff.
|
||||||
|
# - It prevents Google Chrome and Internet Explorer from trying to mime-sniff
|
||||||
|
# - the content-type of a response away from the one being declared by the server.
|
||||||
|
# - It reduces exposure to drive-by downloads and the risks of user uploaded content
|
||||||
|
# - that, with clever naming, could be treated as a different content-type, like
|
||||||
|
# - an executable.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - Content Security Policy
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - The CSP header allows you to define a whitelist of approved sources of content
|
||||||
|
# - for your site. By restricting the assets that a browser can load for your site,
|
||||||
|
# - like js and css, CSP can act as an effective countermeasure to XSS attacks. I
|
||||||
|
# - have covered CSP in a lot more detail in my blog Content Security Policy - An
|
||||||
|
# - Introduction (https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduction/).
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - Here is a basic policy to enforce TLS on all assets and prevent
|
||||||
|
# - mixed content warnings.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src https: data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# - Referrer-Policy
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
# - The HTTP referer (originally a misspelling of referrer[1]) is an HTTP header
|
||||||
|
# - field that identifies the address of the webpage (i.e. the URI or IRI) that
|
||||||
|
# - linked to the resource being requested. By checking the referrer, the new
|
||||||
|
# - webpage can see where the request originated.
|
||||||
|
# -
|
||||||
|
Header set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# - HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
|
# - HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
|
||||||
# -
|
# -
|
||||||
@ -1313,6 +1633,8 @@ cat <<EOF >> ${APACHE_VHOST_DIR}/${WEBSITE_NAME}.conf 2>> $log_file
|
|||||||
# -
|
# -
|
||||||
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000"
|
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SSLEngine on
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SSLCertificateFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_CERT
|
SSLCertificateFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_CERT
|
||||||
SSLCertificateKeyFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_KEY
|
SSLCertificateKeyFile ${APACHE_CERT_DIR}/$APACHE_SERVER_KEY
|
||||||
$SSLCertificateChainFile
|
$SSLCertificateChainFile
|
||||||
@ -2956,7 +3278,7 @@ EOF
|
|||||||
)"
|
)"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
echo ""
|
echo ""
|
||||||
exit 0
|
clean_up 0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# =========================================================================================
|
# =========================================================================================
|
||||||
# =========================================================================================
|
# =========================================================================================
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user